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Robert J. Waldmann 
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Abstract. In “The Relationship Between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry,” Robert 
Hall argues that firms in many U.S. industries charge prices higher than marginal cost. He uses 
a new and controversial method to measure marginal cost comparing the covariance of value 
added and of labour input with instruments for aggregate demand.
The pattern of markups estimated by Hall casts doubt on the validity of this approach. 
He estimates high markups in unconcentrated non-manufacturing industries as well as in 
concentrated industries. Reassuringly, the implausible pattern of estimated markups is caused 
by unreliable methods used to measure value added in most non-manufacturing industries. 
These data are inappropriate for Hall’s purpose, since they contain measurement errors 
negatively correlated with one of Hall’s instruments — the price of oil. This biases up Hall’s 
estimates causing the disturbing pattern.
This trivial explanation of the anomalous results reported by Hall relieve doubts about 
his approach and increase confidence in the evidence for markups reported by Hall and other 
economists. Unfortunately the unreliability of data on value added by most non-manufacturing 
industries makes it much more difficult to investigate the determinants of the ratio of price to 
marginal cost.























































































































































































Robert Hall's article "The Relationship Between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry" 
(Hall, 1988) argued that many American industries charge prices well above marginal costs, 
suggesting either that firms fail to maximize profits or that the possession of substantial market power 
by firms is the rule rather than the exception in the United States. Hall found price exceeding marginal 
cost not only in manufacturing-where high concentration and the plausible existence of important 
economies of scale suggest the importance of market power—but in relatively unconcentrated non­
manufacturing industries as well.
Subsequent research has confirmed Hall's claim that price exceeds marginal cost in United 
States manufacturing industries. Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) applied Hall's method to a 
more detailed and complete manufacturing data set and were able to reject the hypothesis that price 
equalled marginal cost at very high levels of significance. Hall's Journal of Political Economy article, 
however, also analyzes non-manufacturing industries that fall outside of Domowitz, Hubbard, and 
Petersen's data set. Since theories of the causes of markups can be tested more easily with a larger 
sample of industries, and since further work to uncover the determinants and welfare effects of the 
market power apparently possessed by United States firms would benefit from as complete coverage of 
industries as possible, Hall's finding that price exceeds marginal cost outside as well as inside 
manufacturing remains of substantial interest.
The pattern of markups outside of manufacturing reported by Hall is somewhat surprising. 
Hall's regressions find that the highly competitive retail and wholesale trade industries exhibit some of 
the strongest evidence for markups above marginal cost. The relatively unconcentrated petroleum and 
coal products industry—which also sells an undifferentiated product-also exhibits high markups over 
marginal cost. On the other hand, Hall finds only very weak evidence against the hypothesis that the 
highly-concentrated and product-differentiated automobile industry is competitive, even though during 
the bulk of the post-war period covered by his data set foreign competition in automobiles was not an 
issue.




























































































products, wholesale trade, and communications— accurately measure the possession of substantial 
market power by firms in these firms. A critic of Hall might argue that this pattern of estimated 
markups indicates that something is seriously amiss with Hall's methodology. Measures of the markup 
are presented as estimates of the degree of market power possessed by firms, yet the markup estimates 
are not highly correlated with standard estimates of market power.
This, a critic might argue, means that Hall's markup estimates are detecting not market 
power but something else. The surprising pattern of non-manufacturing markups in Hall's paper thus 
might cast into doubt not only Hall's Journal of Political Economy results but also the conclusions of 
Domowitz, Hubbard, and Peterse. Since Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen use Hall's methodology, 
and since Hall's methodology appears to falsely detect market power outside of manufacturing, what 
warrant do we have for thinking that the interpretation of high estimated markups within 
manufacturing industry as revealing market power is valid? In order to credit the finding of high 
market power within manufacturing, we must first understand why Hall's procedure suggests this 
unusual pattern of substantial market power outside of manufacturing as well.
I argue in this note that the unusual pattern of markups is caused by the procedures used by 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis to estimate real value added in non-manufacturing industries. The 
pattern of estimated markups outside the manufacturing sector appears to be due to errors in 
measurement induced by the data construction procedures used. Data on value added in petroleum and 
coal products, wholesale trade, communication, and transportation are calculated by procedures that 
render them useless for Hall's purposes. The defects in the construction of the data used by Hall bias 
his estimates of the ratio of marginal cost to price in those industries downward. Hall rejects the 
hypothesis that price equals marginal cost with more confidence and finds lower ratio of marginal cost 
to price for the suspect industries than for others. And the hypothesis that Hall's instruments are valid 
can be rejected for most of the suspect industries.
The fact that the pattern of markups found by Hall is induced by his use of inappropriate 
data reinforces our confidence in Hall's, and in Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen's, conclusions and 




























































































purposes. Unfortunately, the data problems mean that the only non-manufacturing industry for which 
appropriate data are available is the utilities industry; efforts to identify the causes of high markups are 
therefore restricted to a relatively small data base.
II. HALL'S PROCEDURE AND HIS DATA 
Hall's Insight
Hall's idea was that when firms charge prices above marginal cost, the value of the output 
produced by a marginal worker is greater than his wage. Total factor productivity calculations are 
made assuming that factors are paid their marginal products, and so if price exceeds marginal cost then 
measured total factor productivity will be positively correlated with employment. Employment, 
however, is endogenous and would increase if there were an advance in technology, so Hall 
instruments employment with another variable-either the political party of the president, military 
spending, or the price of oil. Each fraction of Hall's audience would believe that at least one of these 
instruments is uncorrelated with shifts in technology, even though no fraction would believe that all of 
these instruments are.
Hall therefore uses a two step procedure to estimate the markup. First he calculates the 
change in total factor productivity in an industry-the Solow residual—in a given year using:
(1) A(TFP) = A{ln(VA/K)) - aA{ln(Hrs/K)}
where TFP, VA, K, and Hrs are total factor productivity, value added, capital, and hours worked in the 
industry, and where a  is labor’s share of value added. Then Hall regresses the change in measured 
total factor productivity according to (1) on his instrument, and tests the hypothesis that the coefficient 
is zero.
Hall finds that for many industries measured total factor productivity is positively correlated 




























































































is provided almost exclusively by using the oil price as an instrument. The other instruments have 
little power.
Constructing Value Added bv Industry
The Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis constructs the National 
Income and Product Accounts' estimates of value added by industry used by Hall. For several 
industries, the procedures used by the BEA to calculate value added by industry make Hall's oil price 
instrument necessarily correlated with a spurious component in calculated value added. For these 
industries Hall's inferences, made under the assumption that the oil price instrument is appropriate, will 
not be valid.
Three different procedures are used by the Bureau of Economic Analysis to calculate value 
added by industry, depending on the availability of data. For most manufacturing industries the BEA 
uses a double deflation procedure. Nominal gross output in an industry is calculated from data on 
shipments and changes in inventories. Nominal intermediate inputs (materials and services consumed 
in production) are calculated by subtracting nominal factor incomes paid in the industry and additional 
charges such as taxes from nominal gross output. Separate price indices for the industry's final 
products and for its intermediate inputs are then used to calculate constant-dollar gross output and 
input measures. The important point for the purpose of this paper is that in the double-deflation 
procedure constant dollar intermediate inputs are actually measured, albeit indirectly. And the 
estimates of value added have no immediate bias.
The second procedure is a direct deflation method. The direct deflation procedure calculates 
constant-dollar value added by dividing nominal value added-factor payments in the industry-by a 
single price index. Typically, this price index is an index of the price of the industry's output. For 
example, in the trucking and warehousing industry constant-dollar value added is calculated by 
dividing nominal value added by an index of the price of trucking services: dollars charged per ton 
mile.




























































































direct-deflation method will create measurement errors negatively correlated with the price of oil as 
long as the ratio of price to marginal cost does not change and the production function is concave and 
exhibits constant returns to scale. An increase in the price of any input causes a less-than-proportional 
increase in marginal cost: under constant returns to scale, substitution away from a more costly input 
increases its marginal product; since marginal cost is equal to price divided by the marginal product of 
an input, an increase in the price of an input will cause a less-than-proportional increase in marginal 
cost. Assume—as Hall does-that there is no increase in the markup; then the percent increase in the 
price of final output is less than the percent increase in the price of the input.
Since the price of final output is just a weighted average of the value added deflator and the 
price of materials, an increase in the price of materials must cause a smaller percentage increase in the 
value added deflator than in the final output deflator. Therefore if nominal value added is deflated by 
the price of final output, the Bureau of Economic Analysis will record a spurious fall in real value 
added: deflation by the price of final output overcorrects for the increase in the value added deflator 
that follows an increase in materials prices. In other words, for those industries in which the direct 
deflation method is used, the BEA underestimated real value added during the years of upward oil 
price shocks. The real value added data thus contain measurement errors that are negatively correlated 
with the price of oil.
The third procedure used is an extrapolation procedure. For other industries, including the 
petroleum and coal industry; finance, insurance, and real estate; retail trade; and most services, the 
BEA does not estimate intermediate inputs but instead assumes that real value added is proportional to 
an indicator series such as employment or constant dollar gross output, (see Peterson, 1987).
Data on real value added constructed by this procedure will be of little value for Hall's 
purposes. If employment is the indicator series used, then labor productivity is assumed to be acyclic 
by construction. It thus becomes impossible to estimate the cyclical behavior of total factor 
productivity. If gross output is the indicator series used, estimates of value added are only valid if 
purchases of inputs are proportional to gross output-if the production function is Leontief. As the 




























































































the BEA will neglect the reduction in purchased intermediate inputs and instead incorrectly calculate 
that value added per unit factor input has dropped. Again Hall's instrument, the change in the price of 
oil, will be negatively correlated with a spurious component of changes in reported real value added.
The Construction of the Data Bias Estimated Markups Upward
Reported value added in those industries for which the BEA uses direct deflation or 
extrapolation procedures to construct real value added estimates thus suffer from a measurement error 
negatively correlated with the change in the price of oil. Hall’s estimates using the change in the price 
of oil as an instrument of the ratio of marginal cost to price P will be biased downward. Hall 
calculates P using equation 2 (Hall’s equation 22):
(2) P = (cov(otAn,Az))/(cov(Aq,Az))
where Aq is the percentage change in the ratio of real value added to capital, An is the percentage 
change in the labor/capital ratio, a  is labor's share in value added, and Az is the instrument-in this case 
the percentage change in the price of oil. Since an increase in the price of oil reduces production and 
employment, both the numerator and denominator of equation 2 are negative.
The denominator of equation 2 is biased down-away from zero—for those industries with 
data constructed by direct deflation or extrapolation. Therefore the estimate of P is biased down, and 
the estimate of the markup p = 1/p is biased up.
If other instruments used by Hall were also correlated with the price of materials inputs, 
estimates made using them would be biased as well. Since the oil shocks caused reduced growth in 
real GNP, real GNP would also be an invalid instrument and there would be an upward bias in the 
earlier estimates of the ratio of price to marginal cost published in Hall (1986).
The above arguments do not invalidate the results obtained with the two non-oil instruments 
used by in Hall (1988): military spending and the political party of the president. But using these 




























































































than six percent of the time-he rejects in only 3 of 52 regressions. The burden of the empirical results 
in Hall (1988) therefore rests on the validity of Hall's principal instrument, the change in the price of 
oil.
III. EVIDENCE THAT DATA CONSTRUCTION LEADS TO BIASED ESTIMATES
This section evaluates the severity of the bias introduced into Hall's estimates of the markup 
|i by the use of data constructed using direct deflation and extrapolation procedures in two steps. First, 
the results Hall (1988) presents for two digit industries are inspected. Second, direct tests of the 
validity of oil as an instrument using Hall's data set (kindly provided by Hall) are performed.
Exploratory Data Analysis
Table 1 reproduces Hall's table 3 and shows the probability, under the null hypothesis that 
perfect competition obtains and the true ratio of marginal cost to price is 1, of estimating a ratio of 
marginal cost to price |3 as low as that estimated by Hall. Marginal notes indicate the method used by 
the BEA to construct real value added, and the industries for which Hall rejects the null hypothesis that 
price equals marginal cost at the five percent level. For two of the two digit industries studied by H all- 
petroleum and coal products, and retail trade-real value added is constructed by extrapolation from 
gross output. For two other industries-wholesale trade, and communication-real value added is 
estimated by direct deflation, using the price of sector output as the deflator. Finally, each of the three 
procedures is used for different sub-sectors of the transportation industry. For the remaining industries 
the double deflation procedure is used to construct value added.
Using the percent change in the price of oil as an instrument, Hall rejects the hypothesis that 
price equals marginal cost at the 5% level for nine industries. For the twenty-one industries in which 
real value added is calculated by double deflation, Hall rejects the null hypothesis for only five of 
twenty-one industries. Yet he rejects the null hypothesis for four out of five industries in which real 




























































































competition was equally likely in all all industries, the probability that four or more of nine rejections 
belong to a set of only five industries is only 0.03447. Hall's results tend to be strongest when his data 
are untrustworthy.
It is, however, possible that the suspect industries are in fact less competitive than those 
industries for which real value added is constructed by double deflation. It is also possible that 
employment is more cyclical in the industries with suspect data, which would increase the power of 
Hall's test in those industries.
These questions can be addressed indirectly by examining the results reported for the other 
two instruments used by Hall (1988). Using military spending as an instrument, Hall rejects the null 
hypothesis that price equals marginal cost for two industries—one of which has suspect data. The 
probability that one or more of two randomly-selected industries possesses suspect datais over 35%. 
Using the political party of the president as an instrument Hall rejects competition for only one 
industry, for which double deflation is used. The two non-oil instruments certainly do not strongly 
suggest that markups are higher or that employment is more procyclical in industries with suspect data.
Ordinary Least Squares Tests
The preliminary evidence that data problems are affecting Hall's estimates suggests that a 
more thorough analysis of the validity of the price of oil as an instrument is in order. 1 I directly test 
the validity of Hall's oil price instrument by estimating:
(3) aAln(N/K) = c + pAln(Q/K) + yAlnlprice of oil)
using ordinary least squares. If the change in the price of oil is a bad instrument for the suspect 
industries because of the procedures used to construct value added data, the underlying y will be 
positive. When the price of oil rises, true value added falls less than measured value added. Therefore 
employment falls less than would be expected given labor's share and the fall in measured value added. 




























































































demand but are independent of measurement error in the change in value added and the change in 
employment. Accordingly, under the null that the change in the price of oil is an appropriate 
instrument the underlying y in equation 3 will be zero.
Hall (1988) seeks to produce unbiased estimates of the ratio of marginal cost to price p. He, 
therefore, must use instrumental variables since true technological change is correlated with his 
measured regression variables.^ The correlation of true technological progress in an industry with its 
value added biases P downward.
If p is underestimated, the effect on employment of an adverse demand shock is 
underestimated. Since oil price rises are correlated with falls in demand, an underestimated P will 
make an oil price rise associated with a surprisingly large fall in employment given the drop in output. 
The estimated y will therefore be biased down in ordinary least squares estimates of equation 3.
I aim to determine whether y is greater than zero, and to conclude if y is greater than zero 
that oil is a poor instrument. Thus the ordinary least squares estimate of y is biased against the 
alternative hypothesis that the underlying y is positive, and positive estimates of y are more significant 
rejections of the null hypothesis than appears at first glance. It is acceptable to estimate equation 3 
using ordinary least squares to assess the appropriateness of the oil price instrument.^
Ordinary least squares estimates of equation 3 strongly support the suspicion that the change 
in the price of oil is negatively correlated with measurement error in value added for those industries 
with suspect data. The coefficient on oil is positive for four of the five suspect industries. For 
petroleum and coal products, wholesale trade, and transportation the t-statistics are 2.623, 2.695, and 
1.855, rejecting the null hypothesis in favor of the one-sided alternative that the price of oil is 
negatively correlated with measurement error in real value added by industry. For the communication 
industry the coefficient on the change in the price of oil positive but not statistically significant. For 
retail trade the coefficient is not statistically significant and is negative.
In sharp contrast, none of the estimated y coefficients is significant and positive for any of 
the twenty-one industries where double deflation procedures are used to construct value added. For 




























































































be expected given the analysis of the bias in ordinary least squares estimates of y. Complete results are 
reported in table 2.
The results from the different industry regressions can be summarized by taking the 
estimated t-statistics on the coefficient y of oil from the 26 industry regressions and regressing them 
on a constant and an indicator variable equal to one for industries that possess suspect data. The 
disturbance terms of this regression would be independent only if true technological change is 
uncorrelated in different industries. However, Hall (1986) has argued that this is in fact the case.
The summary regression also provides strong evidence that measurement error in the change 
in real value added is negatively correlated with the change in the price of oil. The t-statistic of the 
coefficient on oil is on average 1.486 higher for industries with suspect data. The t-statistic of the 
summary regression is 2.637.4 Even if the petroleum and coal industry, the industry for which the bias 
caused by Hall's procedures is most evident and obvious, is excluded from the summary regression the 
t-statistic is 1.903. Results from the cross industry summary regressions are reported in table 3.
Instrumental Variables Results
It is desirable to determine if ordinary least squares results are consistent with the results of 
two stage least squares regressions like those reported in Hall (1988). I re-estimated equation 3 by 
two-stage least squares using Hall’s instruments to address any concern that the conclusions reported 
above are driven by the use of ordinary least squares. The instruments used in the two-stage least 
squares regressions are a constant, the change in the price of oil, the change in defence spending, and 
the political party of the president.
Unfortunately, as the results using these instruments in Hall (1988) paper show, neither of 
theses instruments is strongly correlated with changes in real value added either. As a result my TSLS 
regressions generate first stage fitted values of the change in real value added which are nearly a 
constant times the change in the price of oil. As a result tests have little power, and these two stage 
least squares regressions cannot be expected to reject the null hypothesis that Hall's results are not 




























































































estimates are consistent with those generated by the ordinary least squares regressions.
Table 4 presents the coefficient on oil in the two stage least squares estimation of equation 3 
using Hall's three instruments. For four of the five industries with suspect data the coefficient on the 
price of oil is positive, as would be expected if the price of oil is not a valid instrument. By contrast, 
there are only four positive estimated y coefficients among the twenty-one industries where real value 
added is calculated by double deflation.
Only one coefficient is statistically significant: the petroleum and coal industry, for which 
real value added is calculated by extrapolation from sales. The world price of oil clearly affects the 
Solow residual in this industry directly, and so Hall's assumption that the oil price affects the level of 
production but not the technology used is invalid in this case. For the communication and wholesale 
trade industries, for which real value added is calculated by direct deflation, the estimated y coefficient 
is positive but not statistically significant.
A summary regression using the reported t-statistics from instrumental variables estimation 
of the coefficient y on the oil price can also be used to pool the evidence for bias generated by the 
negative correlation between measurement error in value added and the change in the price of oil. The 
coefficient on the indicator variable is 1.08, indicating that the t-statistic of the coefficient on oil was 
on average 1.08 higher in the industries with suspect data. The t-statistic of the summary regression 
was 3.06, significant at the 0.269% level against the one sided alternative. When the petroleum and 
coal products industry was excluded from the regression, the coefficient fell to 0.683 and the t-statistic 
fell to 2.01, significant at the 2.79% level against the one sided alternative hypothesis.
Since a constant was included, the above regression allows for the possibility that the 
underlying y was non-zero even in industries where real value added was calculated by double 
deflation. Alternatively, setting the constant equal to zero imposes the requirement that the true 
coefficient y of oil in these industries is zero. This regression gives a t-statistic of only 2.17 including 
the oil industry and of 0.997 excluding it. Complete results are shown in table 3.
This comparison of the two stage and ordinary least squares regressions eases the suspicion 




























































































testing for bias in an ordinary least squares regression would be the Hausman-Wu test. Such a test, 
however, would reject the null too often in a sample as small as the one studied here; in the Hausman- 
Wu test the asymptotic distribution is calculated assuming that the estimated standard error is the true 
standard deviation of the estimate.
Nevertheless, Hausman-Wu tests of the coefficient on oil do not reject the hypothesis that 
the ordinary least squares estimates of the coefficient on oil has the same expected value as the two 
stage least squares estimates. Table 3 also reports Hausman-Wu t-like statistics for the industries with 
suspect data calculated by:
(4) statistic = (Yois - YtslsV((vartsls-varols)1/2)
The Hausman-Wu t-like statistics were also regressed on a the indicator variable with and 
without a constant. The coefficient on the indicator variable would then be likely to be positive if the 
results reported earlier were generated by bias in the ordinary least squares regressions. Instead, the 
point estimate is negative and insignificant with a constant included, and positive but not statistically 
significant—with a t-statistic of 0.244—with the constant excluded. The assertion that the ordinary least 
squares results are unbiased is not rejected by the data.
IV. CONCLUSION
The results reported in section III above confirm the theoretical presumption that the 
constructed data on real value added for five of the industries studied by Hall (1988) cannot be reliably 
used to estimate price cost margins. Measurement error in constructed real value added in these 
suspect industries is correlated with the only powerful instrument used by Hall. Measurement error is 
also presumably correlated with real GNP, the instrument used in Hall's earlier work on the same topic 
(Hall, 1986). These suspect data industries include four of the seven industries for which Hall reports 




























































































analyzed by Hall (1988).
These problems do not clearly invalidate earlier and subsequent research demonstrating 
noncompetitive pricing, such as Hall (1986), and Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988). However, 
they do limit severely the range of industries for which Hall's procedure can be used to obtain reliable 
estimates of markups. The data problems, therefore, greatly hamper efforts to determine the causes of 
high markups by studying a wide sample of industries.
On the other hand, the method used to construct value added data accounts for the 
mysteriously high markups estimated by Hall for some non-manufacturing industries in which firms 
do not appear to possess large amounts of market power. One criticism of Hall (1988) has been that 
since the pattern of markups by industry reported is unbelievable there must be some hidden defect in 
his procedure. Since Hall's anomalous results can be accounted for by data problems which do not 
invalidate his general approach, the results of this note increase confidence in Hall’s method and his 





























































































1 There are two standard ways to evaluate an instrument. The first is the Hausman-Wu test, which in 
this case compares estimates of the ratio of price to marginal cost made with and without that 
instrument. The second is a simple T-test to determine if the instrument should be included as a right 
hand side variable in the instrumented equation.
Since Hall's data set includes only 33 yearly observations for each industry, a Hausman-Wu 
test can not be performed. This test depends on the asymptotic consistency of the estimated standard 
error of the two stage least squares coefficient. It is valid only for large samples. Since for some 
industries the estimated standard error of the estimate of the ratio of price to marginal cost is only very 
slightly lower when oil is included as an instrument, these industries report very high and implausible
value of the Hausman-Wu statistic. Therefore, I concentrate on t-tests of the coefficient y on oil to 
decide whether it is a valid instrument.
^Ordinary least squares estimates of 3 are biased down as long as output per unit of capital increases in 
response to a favorable technological shock. In general let Az be an index of the change in aggregate 
demand, and A9 be the improvement in technology uncorrelated with the change in aggregate demand, 
and let Aq = AAz + CA0, crAn = 3(Aq - A0). The ordinary least squares estimate b of the ratio of 
marginal cost to price will then be given by equation A l:
(Al) b =  3
A2vaifAz) + C(C-l)var(A9) 
A2var(Az) + C2vat(A0)
The estimate of the ratio of marginal cost to price is biased down so long as C is greater than 
zero. C is the elasticity of output with respect to a technological shock. Therefore ordinary least 
squares estimates of 3 are biased down, as asserted, as long as output per unit of capital increases in 
response to a favorable technological shock.
^The first tests of oil as an instrument made were the two-stage least squares tests reported below; I 
then shifted to ordinary least squares estimates in search of greater power.
^This is the standard t-statistic as reported by RATS. Since, under the null hypothesis the variances of 
the t-statistics of the coefficients on oil are one, the standard error of the coefficient on the indicator 
variable could alternatively be calculated under the null assuming that the standard error of the 
disturbance is one. Since the estimated standard error is greater than one for each regression, this 
correction would give a higher t-statistic.
^The limited power of tests based on the instruments used in Hall (1988) also motivates the addition of 
another instrument. A natural addition is the change in real GNP, an instrument Hall used in his earlier 
work (see Hall, 1986). This instrument is correlated with the change in the price of oil: the oil shocks 
of the 1970's caused recessions. Nevertheless, it adds to the precision of the estimates of the 
coefficient y on oil. The bias due to the effect of oil shocks on GNP reduces the chance of finding a 
significant coefficient y on the change in the price of oil in the industries with suspect data.




























































































stage least squares regressions, the results for individual industries are strengthened, but only slightly. 
The sign of the coefficient on oil for the transportation industry switches to the expected positive sign 
but the sign of the coefficient y for retail trade becomes negative. Each remains statistically 
insignificant. The results for the other industries with suspect data are virtually unchanged. The 
coefficients have the same sign and the t-statistics are slightly larger. Similarly, the results of the 
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Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
Industry_________________
20 Food and Kindred Products
21 Tobacco Manufactures
22 Textile Mill Products
23 Apparel and Other Textile Products
24 Lumber and Wood Products
25 Furniture and Fixtures
26 Paper and Allied Products
27 Printing and Publishing
28 Chemicals and Allied Products
29 Petroleum and Coal Products (E)*
30 Rubber and Misc. Plastic Products
31 Leather and Leather Products
32 Stone, Clay, and Glass Products
33 Primary Metals
34 Fabricated Metal Products
35 Machinery Except Electrical










































































































































20 Food and Kindred Products .398 .023* .265
21 Tobacco Manufactures .087 .231 .366
22 Textile Mill Products .253 .082 .170
23 Apparel and Other Textile Products .208 .614 .591
24 Lumber and Wood Products .632 .250 .096
25 Furniture and Fixtures .043* .063 .447
26 Paper and Allied Products .191 .004* .271
27 Printing and Publishing .068 .081 .500
28 Chemicals and Allied Products .184 .001* .291
29 Petroleum and Coal Products (E)** .053 .001* .425
30 Rubber and Misc. Plastic Products .285 .237 .246
31 Leather and Leather Products .141 .494 .161
32 Stone, Clay, and Glass Products .357 .002* .370
33 Primary Metals .155 .341 .221
34 Fabricated Metal Products .265 .092 .304
35 Machinery Except Electrical .748 .063 .624
36 Electric and Electronic Equipment .252 .027* .038*
371 Motor Vehicles and Equipment .369 .124 .376
372-9 Other Transportation Equipment .455 .557 .669
38 Instruments and Related Products .478 .723 .362
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing .452 .144 .075
48 Communications (D) .356 .216 .674
49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services .440 .208 .202
Transportation (M) .022* .020* .219
Wholesale Trade (D) .270 .002* .283
Retail Trade (E) .319 .013* .596
♦Significant at the .05 level.
**(E) denotes an industry for which data are suspect and constructed using extrapolation.
(D) denotes an industry for which data are suspect and constructed using direct deflation.
(M) denotes an industry for which data are suspect and constructed using a mixture of methods.
Note: This table replicates Hall’s table 22. It reports marginal significance levels for a one-tailed test of the 
hypothesis that the covariance of the Solow residual and the instrument is positive, where the sign of the instrument is 



























































































371 Motor Vehicles and Equipment 
372-9 Other Transportation Equipment
38 Instruments and Related Products
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing
48 Communications (D)






















*(E) denotes an industry for which data are suspect and constructed using extrapolation.
(D) denotes an industry for which data are suspect and constructed using direct deflation.
(M) denotes an industry for which data are suspect and constructed using a mixture of methods.
Note: The dependent variable is ocAn, the share of labor times the percent change in hours; P is the estimated 
coefficient on the percent change in value added, and y is the estimated coefficient on the percent change in the price of 





























































































Regressions of T-Statistics on Suspect Data Indicator Variable
Dependent
Variable OLST OLST TSLST TSLST Wu Statistic Wu Statistic
R2 .2246 .2086 .2812 .1356 .0233 .1763
SEE 1.1323 1.1208 .7084 .7610 .5084 .5466
Constant -.1737 -.3407 .2457
(.2471) (.1546) (.1109)
Indicator 1.4856 1.3119 1.0801 0.7393 -.1913 .0544
Variable (.5635) (.5012) (.3525) (.3403) (.2530) (.2445)
P-Value .0072 .0074 .0027 .0197 .7716 .4129
Corrected 
P-Value
.0032 .0035 .0204 .0554 .6480 .4521
Note: The dependent variables are the T-statistics and T-like Wu statistics from the regressions reported in tables 2 
and 4. The indicator variable takes on a value of one for petroleum and coal products, communication, transportation, 
wholesale trade, and retail trade. All regressions use 26 industries. Corrected significance levels are calculated 
assuming that the true variance of the disturbances is one—the variance of the t-statistics under the null hypothesis that 
they have the t-distribution and are unrelated to the indicator variable. All significance levels are one-tailed, and 


































































































Industry___________________________ B 7 Of Y Watson Statistic


































































































































































































.681 2.255 1.054 .150




.685 2.346 .1867 .427




.545 1.671 -.4074 .657




.208 2.674 .0638 .475




.894 1.932 .6780 .252




.333 2.600 -.2731 .607









.530 2.737 .9830 .167




.176 1.032 .2731 .393




.474 2.314 -.3945 .652
*(E) denotes an industry for which data are suspect and constructed using extrapolation.
(D) denotes an industry for which data are suspect and constructed using direct deflation.
(M) denotes an industry for which data are suspect and constructed using a mixture of methods.
Note: See also the note to table 2. The instruments used are military spending, the pice of oil, and the political party 
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